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Abstract 
This paper presents an empirical investigation about the effect of an increase in 
economic inequality on some aspects of the quality of a democracy. The main 
novelty of the paper lies in its methodology: it applies to a single country (instead of 
a pool of countries) - the UK - in a long run perspective. Using survey data, we 
select three questions and check whether an increase in inequality alters the answers 
to these questions, subject to other control variables. Another novelty is the use of 
several measures of inequality (rather than the usual GINI only) both for 
disentangling what happens in the different parts of the income distribution and for 
avoiding the dependence of the results on the choice of the indicator. The main 
finding is that a higher level of income inequality impacts negatively on citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy and positively on their political participation. 
JEL classification: D33; D72; D63; O15. 
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In western advanced economies the reduction in income inequality has been sharp and 
general since the 1st World War, with some countries - like Denmark, Norway and the 
US - starting even earlier. Data for the period post WWII-1970s still support the 
Kuznet’s vision of an inverse-U relationship between development and inequality, but 
after the 1970s a sharp reversal of that equalizing tendency started to be the rule. 
Income inequality increased both in boom and recession and widened in the two 
decades since the mid-1980s. In the late 2000s the majority of OECD countries were 
experiencing high Gini coefficients: the English speaking area - notably the US and 
the UK - and several European countries were ranging from the minimum of 0.30 for 
the Netherlands to the maximum of 0.41 for the US in the 2000-2010 period, while 
Northern Europe (Scandinavian block first) and Japan positioned on average well 
below 0.30, which is considered a “very good Gini”.1 Moreover, English-speaking 
countries have been showing another peculiarity: in US, UK, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and Ireland the share of top 1 per cent in total income before tax is U-shaped 
with the rising portion appearing after the 1970s (while the continental Europe - 
precisely France, Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland - exhibits an L-shaped 
form). The increase in inequality in the majority of the western economies and the 
huge disproportion between the top and the remaining of the distribution recently 
started to be recognized as a social problem.  
This seems particularly true when considering that social mobility shrank in 
some countries of the first group: the correlation between sons’ and fathers’ incomes 
in 2005 was sensibly higher in the US and the UK than in Germany and Scandinavian 
countries: ‘broadly, social mobility in the UK seems to have fallen from North 
                                                          
1
 Stepan and Linz 2011, 847 and 854. 
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European to something close to US level’;2 the probability for the son of being in the 
same earnings quintile as his father is substantially higher in both the 1st and 5th 
quintile in the US and in the UK than in the Scandinavian group where the probability 
is smaller and equally distributed3 the correlation between this intergenerational 
income elasticity and income inequality- the so called “Great Gatsby Curve”4 - is high, 
and the US and the UK are still the countries which perform the worst; lastly, whilst a 
reliable measure of social disease - the index of health and social problems elaborated 
by Wilkinson and Pickett in  2010 - barely shows any relationship with the per-capita 
national income in rich countries, it appears strongly related to inequality. Thus, there 
is a piece of evidence that where income differences are bigger, social distances are 
bigger and social stratification becomes more remarkable. The social distance among 
population-groups can be enormous and it can lead to social exclusion through 
differences in consumption sphere, in health and housing conditions, in access to 
education and to labour market, and in the social-relation network. A harmful 
environment for the attractiveness of the democratic institutions to their citizens might 
easily develop.  
The difficulties to a correct working of democracy when population is not 
uniform by income and wealth are widely dealt with in the political science (and also 
sociology) literature.5 Since Aristotle, the scholars of politics have theorized that the 
proper functioning of a democracy depends on a relatively equal distribution of 
economic resources. For all, Tocqueville stated that the degree of equality is the best 
                                                          
2
 Glyn 2006, 174. 
3
 OECD 2008, 206.  
4
 Krueger 2012. 
5
 See, for instance, Karl 2000; Bermeo 2009; Bartels 2008; Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002; 
Mueller 1988; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Boix 2003.  
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predictor of democracy stability, and of the quality itself of democracy. More recently, 
Dahl6 reminds that economic resources easily become political resources and that an 
unequal distribution can generate frustration and can reduce the sense of community 
and legitimacy leading to a subtle deterioration of democracy. For our mature western 
democracies an appreciable degree of income inequality is not as dangerous as in 
provoking dramatic outcomes. Movements of de-democratization rather occur within 
the democratic regime inducing a failure in the proper functioning of institutions that 
eventually leads to a deterioration of trust and to an estrangement from participation. 
The trend of de-participation leaves empty spaces that may well lead to an oligarchic 
power (in the specific case of a wealth-driven power, the plutarchy, in the Hacker-
Pierson terminology, or plutonomy elsewhere), or to a power that is centred more and 
more on the interest of the few. The desire to keep privileges can favour the partial 
restriction of an open democracy.7  
The quantitative literature concerning the effects of inequality on democracy is 
very scant and it is not centred on the idea of testing the quality of democracy, with 
few exceptions8 considering an array of countries. Our paper joins these contributions 
in so far as it aims precisely at evaluating the quality of democracy. More specifically, 
we first test how inequality impacts on citizens’ satisfaction, which is a suitable 
indicator for the concept of “responsiveness”.9 Then, we inquire about the citizen’s 
reaction towards two of the main characteristics of political life: participating in 
discussion and voting. In addition, we depart from the existing literature which 
performs cross-country analysis either on developing countries or on a mix of 
                                                          
6
  Dahl 1971 and 2000. 
7
  Winters 2011. 
8
  Sunde et al. 2007; Solt 2004 and 2008; Anderson and Beramendi 2008. 
9
  Diamond and Merlino 2004, 27. 
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developing-developed ones.10 We are not interested in a worldwide comparison 
because developing countries differ in fundamental ways from the developed ones, 
and democracies in transition have to be studied separately as well. Even within the 
universe of the developed countries with fully grounded democracy things are 
different: the kind and the reach of policies, their timing, the country-specific social 
norms and institutions, their position in the global economic context and so on. In fact, 
‘…our results suggest that inequality is determined by factors which differ 
substantially across countries’.11 This statement - based on a wide empirical evidence 
- implies that income inequality depends on the country-specific socio-politico-
economic framework, which is sluggish to change, and it reflects the fact that the 
drivers of income inequality (changes in demography and living arrangements, labour 
market trends and government re-distribution, in primis) have varied sensibly across 
OECD countries: no single story holds for all. How could the effect on democracy - 
intended as citizens’ reaction vis-à-vis institutions - be the same?  
Thus, this paper will concentrate on a well-grounded democratic country only 
with a rich advanced economy, on which a time-series analysis for the last thirty years 
through the pooling of cross-section survey-data for the period 1974-2009 will be 
performed. The country chosen is the UK on the basis of the following criteria: i) 
though both the US and the UK have recently experienced an exacerbation in 
inequality, the income composition at the very top is less earnings- than wealth-based 
in the UK, making the fashionable top-incomes problem less relevant; ii) UK is a 
country with a higher taxation level and a greater redistribution than the US; iii) UK is 
                                                          
10
 See Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002 and Atkinson and Brandolini 2006 for reviews. 
11
 Li et al. 1998, 27. 
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the country that invented the modern Welfare State and is a country with an historical 
level of inequality much lower than the U.S.  
Lastly, we do not limit ourselves to the Gini index only as “the” indicator of 
inequality. We use several additional indicators aiming at disentangling what happens 
in the different parts of the income distribution and at avoiding the dependence of the 
results on the choice of a specific indicator. 
The paper is organized as follows: the data and their sources, the variables and 
the model are illustrated; the results of the empirical investigation are provided and 
commented. Concluding remarks briefly summarize the findings. 
Data sources and variables 
The Eurobarometer Survey was used for the “quality of democracy” variables, being 
the only survey that covers the whole time period we are interested in. 
As for income inequality, we computed inequality of household equivalent 
disposable income for the period 1971-2009 using Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
and Family Resources Survey (FRS). Inequality indices have been calculated on 
weekly income, using the two surveys separately. Data were then made uniform in 
order to work with a unique time-series (for each inequality index) describing the 
distribution of disposable income in UK for the entire period 1971 – 2009. 
Dependent variables 
As possible indicators of the quality of democracy we selected the three following 
questions:  
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1. Democracy-Satisfaction. It corresponds to Eurobarometer question “on the whole, 
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy works in your country?” 
2. Political Discussion. This is the answer to the question: “when you get together 
with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or 
never?”  
3. Participation into Elections. This variable is built from the question: “if there were 
a general election tomorrow, which party would you support?” We treated “I would 
not vote” or “I would spoil or blank my vote” as a non-participation decision and any 
other answer as a participation decision independently on the party chosen.  
Few words on these questions. The first – as far as we know never used in this 
kind of studies – was selected as a useful approximation of the concept of 
responsiveness, in the Diamond and Morlino suggestion.12 The second and the third 
recall what done by another author13 with an overlap for the second question and a 
substantial difference with the third where, instead of focusing on the voting 
behaviour in the last election we look at the intention today to participate in 
hypothetical tomorrow-elections, which suits better our research purposes.  
Independent variables 
Inequality indices 
Different indicators can tell a different story on inequality: should they show 
different trends, findings might be entirely due to the index choice. Thus, no choice 
                                                          
12
 Diamond and Morlino 2004. 
13
 Solt 2004 and 2008. 
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has been made and ten distinct inequality indices have been computed using the 
above mentioned British household budget/expenditure surveys.  
In addition to the well-known Gini index, we computed the P90/P10 and 
P90/P50 interdecile ratios, the share of the top 1%, 5% and 10%, and the share of the 
bottom 1%, 5% and 10%. Finally, we computed the Foster-Wolfson polarization 
index, which is ‘… a Gini-like index measure of bipolarization based on the 
curve...[that] indicates how far each population percentile’s income is from the 
median income’.14 The ten indices are highly correlated (see Appendix), all telling 
the same story about inequality in UK: income distribution has been relatively stable 
during the 1970s, then there was a sharp increase in inequality from late 1970s to the 
early 1990s followed by an up and down movement without any of the dramatic 
changes seen in the past.  
This same high correlation suggests that they may be expression of the same 
latent construct, a concept used in factor analysis. The latent construct is reflected 
into observable indicators, called reflective indicators, meaning that the direction of 
causality goes from the unobservable construct to the observable indicators. The 
latent construct can thus be interpreted as the inequality imperfectly measured by 
                                                          
14
 Lambert 2010, p.241. Though the original paper by Foster and Wolfson dates 1992 it has 
been published only in 2010, as Lambert 2010 extensively tells. The index is based on the 
principle that polarization depends on the distance of incomes from the median. After having 
ordered incomes from the lowest to the highest one a curve is calculated, which represents 
the distance (normalized on the median) of the incomes from the median. As for the Lorenz 
curve, cumulative distributions are then calculated, getting a figure symmetrical with respect 
to the median. “In this paper we propose a range-free approach to measuring the middle-
class and polarization… The approach yield two polarization curves which like the Lorenz 
curve in inequality analysis, signals unambiguous increases in polarization”, J. E. Foster and 
M. Wolfson 2010, p. 247.  
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different indicators that are rough and partial realizations of a higher level concept.15 
Thanks to the high correlation of the inequality indices and using factor analysis, we 
are able to find (and measure) the latent variable lying behind (see Appendix). In the 
progress of the paper we will mainly focus on this variable - duly standardized - that 
we simply call “Inequality” leaning on the other inequality indices for comparison 
only. As we expect, given the high correlation, results are largely similar for all 
indicators. 
Control variables 
Personal and household characteristics were considered as control variables: age, 
education (university and secondary degree vs. lower educational level), gender 
(male vs. female), marital status (married vs. other status such as being single, 
divorced or widow). Additionally, we included information on occupational status: 
self-employed or entrepreneur, manager, white collar, manual worker, retired from 
work, unemployed, each vs. the group of non-active population. A dummy variable 
captures differences between individuals living in an urban area vs. individuals living 
in a rural area. Also a time trend and a dummy for the two parts of the UK where the 
person interviewed lives (Great Britain vs. Northern Ireland) have been included.  
Subsequently also the household income variable has been considered in order 
to take care of another important difference able to influence the answers: how much 
“rich” people are. We did not include it in the first estimates because of some 
methodological shortcomings of the Eurobarometer variable. More on that follows. 
                                                          
15
 Bollen and Lennox 1991; Edwards and Bagozzi 2000. 
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The models 
We estimated three distinct equations, one for each dependent variable. Due to the 
nature of data, ordered probit models were used for Democracy-Satisfaction and 
Political Discussion whilst Participation into Elections was treated with a probit. In 
particular, Democracy-Satisfaction is an ordinal variable, recoded from a descendant 
into an ascendant scale, taking value 1 if “Not at all satisfied”, 2 if “Not very 
satisfied”, 3 if “Fairly satisfied” and 4 if “Very satisfied”. Political Discussion takes 
different values according to how often the interviewed discusses about politics. 
Recoded into a convenient way, it takes values: 1 if “Never”; 2 if “Occasionally”; 3 
if “Frequently”. Participation into Elections has been recoded to take value 1 if 
“Would vote” and 0 otherwise (“Would not vote/I would blank or spoil my vote/ I 
would definitely not vote”).  
The three models are:  
uGBβyearβurbanβ
unemployedβretiredβmanualβrwhitecollaβmanagerβedselfemployβ
secondaryβuniversityβmarriedβmaleβageβinequalityβonsatisfacti
151413
121110987
654321
+++
++++++
++++++=
 
 
uGBβyearβurbanβ
unemployedβretiredβmanualβrwhitecollaβmanagerβedselfemployβ
secondaryβuniversityβmarriedβmaleβageβinequalityβdiscussion
151413
121110987
654321
+++
++++++
++++++=
 
 
uGBβyearβurbanβ
unemployedβretiredβmanualβrwhitecollaβmanagerβedselfemployβ
secondaryβuniversityβmarriedβmaleβageβinequalityββvote
151413
121110987
6543210
+++
++++++
+++++++=
 
Results 
For the sake of simplicity we provide the entire estimated equation only where the 
main inequality indicator (Inequality) is present (Table 1). Where we use the ten 
remaining indicators, only their coefficient is shown (Table 2). The reported results 
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are informative only in terms of sign and statistical significance and they cannot be 
read quantitatively since our modelling framework is not linear. This is why we must 
calculate the “marginal effect”,16 which together with the predicted probability 
allows us to assess quantitatively the relation between the dependent and independent 
variables. Though the marginal effects are reported in the Appendix, Tables A7-9, 
we provide in the text an assessment of the quantitative relevance of the results for 
each question.  
Democracy-Satisfaction  
The first important result is that an increase in the level of inequality depresses 
Democracy-Satisfaction (first column of Table 1).  
In addition, Democracy-Satisfaction increases with age (ageing people become 
wiser, or more indulgent, or more tolerant); males are more satisfied with democracy 
than women and married people more than individuals in another marital status (do 
women and singles have a greater sense of moral justice? Do they complain  more 
about institutions that take care of them less than of men and families?); it increases 
with education - having university or a secondary degree vs. having a lower 
qualification - (does education helps in evaluating democracy and its virtues?). Also 
living in Great Britain vs. living in Northern Ireland impacts positively and 
significantly on Democracy-Satisfaction, while living in an urban area negatively 
affects it (do cities present more occasions for evaluating institutions than the 
country-side does?). There exists a positive time-trend in the probability of being 
                                                          
16
 Given the predicted probability of each outcome of the dependent variable (computed 
when all RHS variables do not change and are equal to their median value), the marginal 
effect is its changes when one RHS variable changes (in particular, they are computed 
changing the continuous variables from their minimum to their maximum while changing 
from 0 to 1 in the case of dummies). 
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satisfied with democracy. The coefficients relative to the various employment 
positions tell us the different probability that self-employed, managers, white collars, 
manual workers, retired from work and unemployed are more satisfied by 
democracy, all with respect to the control group: the non-actives. In particular, we 
find that managers and white collars are more satisfied while the opposite is found 
for manual workers and unemployed (who represent less-protected categories). On 
the contrary, self-employed and retired from work do not statistically differ from the 
non-actives in their level of Democracy-Satisfaction. 
Quantitatively speaking (Table A7), the democracy-satisfaction increases in 
probability for an amount of several percentage points with age, with male gender, 
with education, with a good job, with geographical location (country side and North 
Ireland instead of urban places and Great Britain) and through time. Thus, on the 
quantitative side (see the Appendix for the marginal effects) the figures for 
Democracy-Satisfaction are on overall fairly important.  
Political Discussion 
The second column of Table 1 presents the results of the model for Political 
Discussion, showing that it is significantly revitalised by an increase in inequality. 
Relying on the precedent result on Democracy-Satisfaction, the discontent about the 
quality of democracy induced by an increase in inequality does not turn into any 
reduction in political participation. On the contrary, it appears nourishing a more 
lively Political Discussion.  
Significant coefficients are also found for almost every regressor: ageing, being 
male, being married, being well educated, living in an urban area and living in Great 
Britain, all increase the frequency of talking about politics. It seems again that 
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experience and social status helps in being more involved with the surrounding 
world, while the gender-result reaffirms that it is not in women habits to talk about 
politics. The time trend has a negative coefficient, implying that Political Discussion 
today is not as frequent as it was in the past. The occupational status variables 
suggest that people in every category but unemployment are significantly more likely 
than non-actives in talking more frequently about politics. Contrarily to the previous 
question where the Democracy-Satisfaction depended on working conditions, here 
the results are uniform. Does having a job make everybody feel part of a community? 
Does it suggest that Political Discussion might be useful in one’s own job-space? 
Does having a job just simply provide more opportunities for Political Discussion? 
Table A8 in the Appendix gives us the quantitative effects: here again, the 
political discussion increases substantially in probability with age, male gender, 
better education and good job. Again, these figures too are quite important 
quantitatively. 
Participation into Elections 
The third column of Table 1 shows the results of the probit model on the decision of 
voting if there were a general election tomorrow. Again, a positive effect of 
inequality on political participation is confirmed: an increase in inequality increases 
the Participation into Elections with statistical significance.  
In addition, ageing, being married, having a higher educational level, and 
living in GB increase the electoral participation (results are on average highly 
consistent with the previous ones on political discussion) with statistical significance. 
The time trend has a negative coefficient suggesting that, other things being equal, 
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Participation into Elections in UK is decreasing through time (as it was the Political 
Discussion attitude).  
No statistically significant effect is found for being male and living in an urban 
area. On the contrary, occupational status is linked to electoral participation: 
managers and white collars are more likely to vote than non-actives, whilst the 
opposite is true for the unemployed (here again the results are consistent with the 
previous ones). No significant coefficient in found for the other occupational 
categories. 
Table A9 in the Appendix shows that the likelihood of Participating into 
Elections is quantitatively less reactive than the two first questions, showing a 
relevant marginal effect only for time trend and geographical location. Thus, the 
overall results are quantitatively small. 
The first synthesis is that Democracy-Satisfaction is the question most affected 
by the variable Inequality, whilst Political Discussion is the question which reacts 
more importantly in quantitative terms to all the RHS variables.  
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Table 1 - Estimation results of ordered probit and probit models on Democracy-
Satisfaction, Political Discussion and Participation into Elections 
  
Democracy-
Satisfaction 
Political 
Discussion 
Participation into 
Elections 
Inequality  -0.078**   0.028**   0.092** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.022)  
Age  0.003**   0.008**   0.009** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  
Male  0.036**   0.248** 0.025  
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.023)  
Married  0.052**   0.121**   0.139** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.022)  
Education: University  0.149**   0.597**   0.254** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.042)  
Education: secondary  0.135**   0.172**   0.093** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.025)  
Self-
employed/entrepreneur 0.007   0.317** -0.025  
 (0.025) (0.021)  (0.047)  
Manager  0.090**   0.365**   0.166** 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.051)  
White collar   0.065**  0.232**   0.103** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.035)  
Manual worker -0.042* 0.026 -0.005  
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.032)  
Retired  0.014   0.051** 0.050  
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.042)  
Unemployed  -0.247** -0.003 -0.105* 
 (0.028)  (0.023) (0.044)  
Urban -0.067**   0.072** -0.014  
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.022)  
Year  0.009**   -0.010** -0.028** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  
Great Britain  0.477**    0.122**   0.465** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)  
 
   
Threshold 1/Constant 17.564** -18.931**   -55.898** 
 (2.175) (1.690) (4.633)  
Threshold 2 18.482** -17.408**               
 (2.175) (1.690)               
Threshold 3 20.040**                
  (2.176)                 
Obs 60,699 93,631 52,461 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
17 
 
As anticipated, we run the three models with the ten alternative indicators, 
starting with the traditional Gini, in order to check whether the results were robust 
everywhere along the entire distribution (Table 2).  Our main indicator (Inequality) is 
presented again in the first row for the sake of comparison.  
 Table 2 -   Estimated coefficients of the 11 inequality indices 
  
Democracy- 
Satisfaction 
Political  
Discussion 
Participation in 
 Elections  
Inequality -0.078** 0.028** 0.092** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.022)  
Gini coefficient  -1.925** 0.689** 2.384** 
 (0.265) (0.222) (0.556)  
Foster-Wolfson index -2.918** 0.981** 2.169** 
 (0.285) (0.234) (0.606)  
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  -0.147** 0.047** 0.106** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.032)  
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 -0.595** 0.278** 0.615** 
 (0.075) (0.063) (0.156)  
Share top 1%  0.045 0.028 2.864* 
 (0.565) (0.484) (1.123)  
Share top 5%  -1.776** 0.666 3.383** 
 (0.455) (0.392) (0.932)  
Share top 10%  -2.073** 0.827* 3.257** 
 (0.407) (0.349) (0.844)  
Share bottom 1%  349.047** -66.771* -97.847  
 (33.642) (30.259) (67.628)  
Share bottom 5%  37.248** -12.823** -33.853** 
 (4.025) (3.496) (8.110)  
Share bottom 10%  15.063** -4.998** -13.198** 
  (1.656) (1.399) (3.368)  
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.  Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
No statistically significant result clashes with our first evidence: an increase in 
inequality, no matter how it is measured, reduces the level of Democracy-
Satisfaction, and increases both Political Discussion and Participation into Elections. 
Just two indicators of inequality do not have effect: the share of top 1% for the first 
two questions, and the share of bottom 1% for the third one. In other words, there is 
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no repercussion on Democracy-Satisfaction and Political Discussion when the 
income-share of the “very rich” grows (is it not considered a problem by people?) 
and there is no repercussion on Participation into Elections when the income-share 
of the “very poor” grow (is it considered a problem not surmountable by voting?). 
Does income matter? 
Though moral aversion to inequality may theoretically be distributed roughly 
uniformly across income levels, it may reasonably be argued that a growing 
inequality let the riches be better off than the poor and, therefore, that the actual 
attitude is likely to differ for persons lying in different portions of income 
distribution. In order to investigate this feature we re-estimated the three models 
(Democracy-Satisfaction, Political Discussion and Participation into Elections) in 
two separate steps: first, the income level was added as an additional explanatory 
variable; thereafter, the population was segmented by income size and separate 
regression models for each income quintile were run. The new questions are: 1) does 
considering income just as an additional explanatory variable improve the overall 
estimation (and does the measure of inequality matter)? 2) does running the 
regressions over a population differentiated by income size (quintiles) improve the 
overall estimation (and does the measure of inequality matter)? In other words: is 
income important and which is the best way of considering it? 
The income level variable of the first step – the household income decile – has 
always a positive and significant effect (Table 3): the richer you are the more 
satisfied with democracy and the more politically participative you are. As far as the 
other variables are concerned, the outcomes are different depending on the questions. 
All the variables – with the only exception of the marital status – keep sign and 
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significance in the case of Political Discussion. Moreover, the category 
“unemployed” becomes significant: once their (low) income has been taken out, their 
only anger remains. 
Table 3 - Estimation results of ordered probit and probit models on Democracy-
Satisfaction, Political Discussion and Participation into Elections adding 
Household income-decile as an independent variable 
  
Democracy- 
Satisfaction 
Political 
Discussion 
Participation into 
Elections 
Inequality -0.138** 0.129** 0.091** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.034)  
HH Income decile 0.045** 0.054** 0.030** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)  
Age 0.004** 0.008** 0.011** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Male 0.021 0.215** 0.012  
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.031)  
Married 0.009 0.028 0.096** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.031)  
Education: University 0.047 0.505** 0.160** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.055)  
Education: secondary 0.131** 0.119** 0.087* 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.035)  
Self-employed/entrepr. -0.023 0.234** -0.106  
 (0.033) (0.028) (0.063)  
Manager 0.000 0.260** 0.033  
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.067)  
White collar 0.021 0.168** 0.021  
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.048)  
Manual worker -0.064** 0.011 -0.098* 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.044)  
Retired from work 0.042 0.071** -0.013  
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.060)  
Unemployed -0.234** 0.163** -0.037  
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.061)  
Urban -0.061** 0.068** 0.019  
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.030)  
Year 0.018** -0.023** -0.028** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)  
Great Britain 0.530** 0.113** 0.449** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.027)  
 
   
Threshold 1/Constant 35.634** -45.116** -55.286** 
 (5.095) (4.228) (8.727)  
Threshold 2 36.564** -43.552**               
 (5.095) (4.228)               
Threshold 3 38.122**                
  (5.096)                 
Obs 
 
37,425 
 
51,689 
 
33,346 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data; 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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In the cases of Democracy Satisfaction and Participation into Elections an 
interesting aspect emerges: the statistical significance disappears mainly for the “rich 
categories” (identifiable through high level education and jobs) meaning that it is 
income what matters rather than these characteristics: for Democracy-Satisfaction, 
males, people married, and people with university degree and with a good job; for 
Participation into Elections, managers and white collar. Here again “unemployed” 
plays an interesting role in so far as its statistical significance disappears, meaning 
that it was low income rather than working position to depress their intention to vote.  
The income variable has the same positive and significant effect also when the 
model is run with the ten additional inequality indices (Table 4). Like in the model  
Table 4 - Estimated coefficients of the 11 inequality indices in the models with 
income decile 
  
 
Democracy- 
Satisfaction 
Political 
Discussion 
Participation into 
Elections 
Inequality -0.138** 0.129** 0.091** 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.034) 
Gini coefficient  -3.433** 3.233** 2.410** 
 (0.473) (0.407) (0.845) 
Foster-Wolfson index -4.616** 3.876** 2.403** 
 (0.463) (0.413) (0.921) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  -0.228** 0.212** 0.103* 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.049) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 -0.847** 0.912** 0.579* 
 (0.116) (0.104) (0.225) 
Share top 1%  0.818 1.975* 1.258 
 (0.914) (0.781) (1.543) 
Share top 5%  -2.646** 3.553** 2.630* 
 (0.796) (0.679) (1.239) 
Share top 10%  -3.410** 3.930** 2.773* 
 (0.722) (0.617) (1.239) 
Share bottom 1%  438.620** -208.983** -108.855 
 (49.583) (45.486) (92.007) 
Share bottom 5%  52.355** -43.941** -33.742** 
 (6.363) (5.714) (12.025) 
Share bottom 10%  21.895** -19.398** -13.024* 
  (2.636) (2.385) (5.072) 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses.  Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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without the variable income two indicators of inequality do not have effect: the share 
of top 1% for the first and the third question, and the share of bottom 1% for the third 
one.  
In the second step, we run the three models with the population split by income 
quintile.  
This procedure does not change substantially the results as far as the main 
indicator Inequality is concerned (Table 5 collects only the coefficients of the 
Inequality index for the different models).  
Table 5 - Estimated coefficients of Inequality with population split by income quintile 
  
 
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Democracy-Satisfaction -0.218** -0.191** -0.157** -0.110** -0.038  
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043)  
Political Discussion  0.187** 0.119**  0.094* 0.104**  0.153** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)  
Electoral participation 0.072 0.030  0.157* -0.010  0.186* 
  (0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075)  
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
In the case of Democracy-Satisfaction the effect of the variable Inequality is 
negative at every income-interval, it decreases in absolute value from the poorest to 
the richest group and it is significant everywhere except for the richest group: that is, 
the frustrating effect of income inequality is particularly felt by the less rich and 
poorest individuals. As regards Political Discussion, there is a U-shaped profile: the 
effect of the variable Inequality for every income-interval is positive and significant, 
and higher for the poorest and the richest quintile. Perhaps both groups discuss more 
than others since they are particularly concerned with their position: the very poor 
need to improve their condition and the very rich need to preserve it. The effect of 
Inequality on Participation into Elections is less clear in so far as it is positive and 
significant only for the third and fifth income quintile: the “middle class” and the 
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very riches. Do the poorest people think there no  possibility of changing their 
condition with elections, while the middle class and the top-class intend to defend 
their positions? 
The coefficient of the controls (Table 6-8) shows - through a confrontation 
with Table 1 - in which quintile the statistical significance is really located.  
Table 6 - Model on Democracy-Satisfaction by income quintile 
  
 
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Inequality -0.218** -0.191** -0.157** -0.110** -0.038 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) 
Age 0.006** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Male 0.035 0.037 0.001 0.006 0.069* 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Married -0.065 -0.016 0.061 0.091* 0.056 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) 
Education: University 0.181 0.042 0.143* 0.009 -0.012 
(0.104) (0.078) (0.060) (0.053) (0.049) 
Education: secondary 0.083* 0.176** 0.130** 0.173** 0.076 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.044) 
Self-employed/entrepreneur 0.021 -0.060 0.077 -0.060 -0.138* 
(0.137) (0.083) (0.075) (0.070) (0.062) 
Manager 0.029 0.235* 0.044 0.021 -0.114* 
(0.214) (0.118) (0.081) (0.066) (0.058) 
White collar 0.140 0.088 -0.042 0.028 -0.079 
(0.090) (0.058) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) 
Manual worker -0.040 0.001 -0.050 -0.093 -0.233** 
(0.061) (0.050) (0.047) (0.052) (0.060) 
Retired  0.046 0.044 0.089 -0.003 -0.032 
(0.044) (0.057) (0.072) (0.088) (0.099) 
Unemployed -0.206** -0.166* -0.183 -0.325** -0.154 
(0.062) (0.072) (0.101) (0.122) (0.138) 
Urban -0.105** -0.045 -0.077* -0.027 -0.047 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) 
Year 0.032** 0.028** 0.017** 0.012* 0.005 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Great Britain 0.349** 0.435** 0.562** 0.657** 0.709** 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) 
Threshold 1 62.836** 55.510** 32.703** 24.372* 8.653 
(11.698) (11.649) (11.239) (11.119) (11.300) 
Threshold 2 63.743** 56.441** 33.638** 25.344* 9.584 
(11.700) (11.650) (11.239) (11.120) (11.300) 
Threshold 3 65.087** 57.929** 35.240** 26.989* 11.242 
  (11.702) (11.652) (11.240) (11.121) (11.301) 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 - Model on Political Discussion by income quintile 
  
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Inequality 0.187** 0.119** 0.094* 0.104** 0.153** 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Age 0.004** 0.007** 0.012** 0.011** 0.011** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male 0.182** 0.174** 0.265** 0.226** 0.220** 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) 
Married 0.027 0.008 -0.073* 0.017 0.072 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) 
Education: University 0.637** 0.601** 0.501** 0.522** 0.487** 
(0.066) (0.059) (0.053) (0.044) (0.047) 
Education: secondary 0.145** 0.102** 0.098** 0.115** 0.136** 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.040) 
Self-employed/entrepreneur 0.455** 0.344** 0.218** 0.172** 0.168** 
(0.102) (0.078) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) 
Manager 0.396** 0.419** 0.250** 0.257** 0.226** 
(0.145) (0.095) (0.075) (0.057) (0.056) 
White collar 0.165* 0.226** 0.167** 0.119** 0.124* 
(0.074) (0.054) (0.046) (0.046) (0.051) 
Manual worker 0.030 0.017 -0.014 0.005 -0.101 
(0.053) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.060) 
Retired  0.092* 0.190** 0.008 0.032 -0.077 
(0.040) (0.052) (0.066) (0.078) (0.093) 
Unemployed 0.166** 0.157* 0.057 0.061 0.165 
(0.051) (0.062) (0.082) (0.099) (0.109) 
Urban 0.027 0.025 0.098** 0.087** 0.103** 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Year -0.025** -0.026** -0.021** -0.025** -0.024** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Great Britain 0.119** 0.182** 0.026 0.104** 0.112** 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.037) (0.039) 
 
     
Threshold 1 -50.226** -50.283** -40.619** -49.829** -47.992** 
(9.544) (9.853) (9.500) (9.280) (9.377) 
Threshold 2 -48.906** -48.839** -39.012** -48.182** -46.230** 
(9.544) 
 
(9.851) 
 
(9.499) 
 
(9.279) 
 
(9.376) 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 - Model on Participation into Elections by income quintile 
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Inequality 0.072 0.030 0.157* -0.010 0.186* 
(0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075) 
Age 0.012** 0.006* 0.010** 0.019** 0.009* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male 0.102 -0.072 -0.019 0.065 -0.043 
(0.072) (0.074) (0.068) (0.065) (0.074) 
Married 0.082 0.076 0.065 0.016 0.197* 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.078) (0.086) 
Education: University 0.003 0.238 0.240 0.407** -0.006 
(0.168) (0.146) (0.142) (0.110) (0.108) 
Education: secondary 0.050 0.170* -0.060 0.268** 0.031 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.071) (0.074) (0.093) 
Self-employed/entrepreneur 0.344 -0.170 -0.115 -0.301* 0.022 
(0.248) (0.155) (0.130) (0.133) (0.130) 
Manager 0.316 0.042 0.008 -0.133 0.159 
(0.459) (0.225) (0.169) (0.140) (0.125) 
White collar 0.143 0.096 -0.015 -0.147 0.148 
(0.171) (0.120) (0.098) (0.103) (0.113) 
Manual worker -0.131 -0.055 -0.033 -0.178 -0.129 
(0.100) (0.098) (0.091) (0.105) (0.119) 
Retired  -0.120 0.267* 0.006 -0.204 -0.113 
(0.092) (0.117) (0.151) (0.189) (0.280) 
Unemployed -0.070 -0.087 0.159 -0.182 0.135 
(0.097) (0.117) (0.162) (0.219) (0.258) 
Urban 0.041 -0.020 -0.072 0.027 0.108 
(0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.065) (0.069) 
Year -0.014 -0.032** -0.036** -0.018 -0.039** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Great Britain 0.473** 0.461** 0.351** 0.536** 0.469** 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.072) 
Constant -27.381 -64.407** -71.582** -35.725 -78.390** 
  
(17.945) 
 
(18.515) 
 
(20.124) 
 
(20.035) 
 
(19.804) 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
In the case of Democracy-Satisfaction, age, secondary education, being 
unemployed, time trend and living in Great Britain are significant almost 
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everywhere, whilst male-gender, marital status, university degree, having a good job 
and living in an urban area loose significance almost everywhere (each remaining 
significant in a quintile only, generally the higher ones, except for the urban area). 
For Political Discussion age, male-gender, university and secondary degree, being 
self-employed, manger and white collar, time trend and living in Great Britain are 
significant everywhere, whilst marital status, being unemployed and living in an 
urban area loose significance almost everywhere, with the latter keeping significance 
only in the upper quintiles and being unemployed only in the lower ones. In the case 
of Participation into Elections age, time trend and living in Great Britain are 
significant almost everywhere whilst being manager, white collars and unemployed 
loose significance everywhere. Marital status and secondary university degree 
remain significant in the upper quintiles.  
Tables 9-11 show the regressions run with the ten additional inequality indices. 
The general pattern found with Inequality is confirmed for the first two questions, 
except when the extreme income-shares are used as indicators, whilst more 
exceptions are present in the third one. In particular, for Democracy-Satisfaction the 
top 1% share does not have any effect on any income quintile, the top 5% share 
negatively affects only the poorest quintile, whilst the bottom 1% share affects 
positively and significantly every single group, as if people would be aware of 
inequality as a problem for democracy only when it hits the poor. As for Political 
Discussion, once the other indices are used the pattern does not change generally. 
The coefficients related to the top 1% and top 5% share confirm that the effect of 
inequality is higher for the poorest and the richest quintile, though no statistically 
significant effect is found for the intermediate quintiles. On the contrary, when the 
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share of bottom 1% is the variable for inequality the effect is higher for the first and 
third quintile, not for the richest any longer: the very poor are even more sensible to 
their position whilst the very rich do not need reacting since their position is 
unaffected by the change in inequality.  
Table 9 - Estimated coefficients of the 11 inequality indices in the model for 
Democracy-Satisfaction by income quintile 
  
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Inequality -0.218** -0.191** -0.157** -0.110** -0.038  
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.043)  
Gini coefficient  -5.675** -4.819** -4.002** -2.699** -0.598 
 (1.068) (1.076) (1.053) (1.017) (1.059) 
Foster-Wolfson index -7.042** -6.159** -5.391** -3.866** -1.180 
 (1.064) (1.048) (1.023) (1.006) (1.024) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  -0.331** -0.311** -0.254** -0.203** -0.065 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 -1.312** -1.269** -1.033** -0.759** -0.012 
 (0.265) (0.260) (0.262) (0.245) (0.259) 
Share top 1%  1.369 2.378 0.446 0.899 -0.751 
 (2.086) (2.080) (2.077) (1.952) (2.029) 
Share top 5%  -4.486* -3.320 -3.366 -1.842 -0.774 
 (1.785) (1.808) (1.799) (1.703) (1.787) 
Share top 10%  -5.588** -4.721** -4.309** -2.497 -0.667 
 (1.613) (1.639) (1.629) (1.542) (1.625) 
Share bottom 1%  520.199** 563.376** 388.173** 301.267** 439.893** 
 (115.938) (114.257) (108.674) (109.996) (106.327) 
Share bottom 5%  77.721** 73.991** 50.049** 44.498** 20.743 
 (15.021) (14.447) (14.082) (13.669) (13.970) 
Share bottom 10%  33.915** 30.760** 22.324** 18.814** 6.205 
 
(6.117) 
 
(6.042) 
 
(5.837) 
 
(5.687) 
 
(5.801) 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
In the case of Participation into Elections, when inequality is measured by the 
90/50 interdecile ratio, the top 1%, 5% and 10% income shares, a positive and 
significant effect is found only for the richest quintile (while no significant result is 
found on the other quintiles) and no statistically significant result is found when the 
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variable for inequality is the share of bottom 1%: the richest want to consolidate their 
position with an electoral action whilst nobody thinks that elections might be useful  
when inequality comes through an increase in the poorest part of the population. 
When the 90/10 interdecile ratio and the shares of the bottom 5% and 10% are 
considered, the only significant effect is found on the third quintile.  
Table 10 - Estimated coefficients of the 11 inequality indices in the model for 
Political Discussion by income quintile 
  
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Inequality 0.187** 0.119** 0.094* 0.104** 0.153** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) 
Gini coefficient  4.752** 3.076** 2.269* 2.613** 3.721** 
 (0.900) (0.955) (0.906) (0.891) (0.922) 
Foster-Wolfson index 4.953** 3.834** 2.837** 3.874** 4.057** 
 (0.932) (0.953) (0.928) (0.918) (0.918) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  0.262** 0.209** 0.146** 0.208** 0.243** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 1.034** 0.994** 0.584* 0.988** 1.012** 
 (0.233) (0.243) (0.235) (0.228) (0.234) 
Share top 1%  4.670** 0.437 1.571 -0.272 4.165* 
 (1.737) (1.834) (1.742) (1.670) (1.773) 
Share top 5%  6.051** 2.679 2.563 2.025 4.994** 
 (1.492) (1.603) (1.517) (1.457) (1.547) 
Share top 10%  6.034** 3.317* 2.744* 2.937* 5.089** 
 (1.353) (1.457) (1.377) (1.327) (1.407) 
Share bottom 1%  -349.456** -168.917 -295.226** -55.019 -181.429 
 (101.556) (103.879) (100.088) (102.217) (102.177) 
Share bottom 5%  -60.942** -42.413** -34.878** -33.506** -50.155** 
 (12.690) (13.178) (12.648) (12.885) (12.767) 
Share bottom 10%  
-27.170** -19.075** -14.344** -15.428** -21.895** 
 
(5.304) 
 
(5.519) 
 
(5.285) 
 
(5.328) 
 
(5.355) 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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Table 11 - Estimated coefficients of the 11 inequality indices in the model for 
Participation into Elections by income quintile 
  
First 
quintile 
Second 
quintile 
Third 
quintile 
Fourth 
quintile 
Fifth 
quintile 
Inequality 0.072 0.030 0.157* -0.010 0.186* 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075) 
Gini coefficient  1.967 0.820 4.204* -0.119 4.690* 
 (1.789) (1.848) (1.916) (1.916) (1.847) 
Foster-Wolfson index 2.170 -0.081 5.355** -0.132 4.176* 
 (1.989) (2.002) (2.051) (2.122) (2.034) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  0.071 -0.051 0.252* 0.013 0.208 
 (0.108) (0.105) (0.109) (0.115) (0.108) 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 0.495 0.004 0.985 0.022 1.325** 
 (0.486) (0.492) (0.520) (0.509) (0.486) 
Share top 1%  -0.025 2.616 -0.528 -3.335 7.286* 
 (3.336) (3.449) (3.432) (3.325) (3.636) 
Share top 5%  1.629 2.004 2.971 -1.291 7.395* 
 (2.821) (2.957) (3.055) (2.926) (3.045) 
Share top 10%  2.050 1.662 3.841 -1.130 6.985* 
 (2.598) (2.732) (2.837) (2.731) (2.761) 
Share bottom 1%  -46.206 44.351 -265.456 6.838 -226.234 
 (206.873) (191.013) (191.620) (200.620) (226.186) 
Share bottom 5%  -28.809 -5.111 -68.147** -11.979 -47.246 
 (26.876) (25.731) (26.397) (27.868) (26.432) 
Share bottom 10%  
-10.415 0.211 -27.807* -4.429 -19.583 
 
(11.273) 
 
(10.844) 
 
(11.158) 
 
(11.854) 
 
(11.063) 
 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer data 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Though the re-estimation of the models with a focus on income and more specifically 
on population segmented by income size is a necessary step, and notwithstanding the 
illuminating results we obtained, the Eurobarometer “income” variable does not 
possess a satisfactory statistical appeal. First, data source does not collect all the 
information needed for calculating the household equivalized income. Second, 
household income has many missing observations, and a problem of selection-bias 
arises whether the non-response is not purely random, as it is often the case. Thirdly, 
income is not reported as such but it is collected in classes that differ in size and 
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number from year to year. In order to create an ordinal income class variable, we must 
at least assume that it is uniformly distributed within classes. Lastly, the concept of 
income used is not disposable income, but gross income, which includes benefits 
though being before taxes and social contributions. Unfortunately, we must be sticking 
to the Eurobarometer survey data, which is the only survey that covers the whole time 
period we are interested in. 
Concluding remarks 
As far as we know, this paper is the first one relating income inequality - measured 
through a wide array of indicators - to some aspects of the quality of a democracy in 
an advanced-economy and rooted-democracy country, in a long-run perspective. 
We tested the impact of inequality on three (possible) indicators of the quality 
of democracy: citizens’ satisfaction and citizens’ attitude to participation in the two 
aspects of political discussion and intention to voting. The hypothesis that growing 
inequality has effect on the perception of the quality of democracy somehow 
captured through our three questions is highly confirmed no matter how inequality is 
measured. In summary, Democracy-Satisfaction is the question most affected by the 
variable Inequality and Political Discussion is the question which reacts more 
importantly in quantitative terms to all the RHS variables. Our results are robust vis-
à-vis whatever indicator of inequality is used, arraying from the standard Gini to the 
interdecile ratios and a polarization index. Moreover, the robustness is substantially 
unaffected by a more refined analysis able to distinguish the population’s answers by 
income-size.  
Our findings reveal that inequality decreases citizens’ satisfaction and 
stimulates their participation. Though a positive reaction to a discontent is one of the 
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two possible outcomes debated in the political theory,17 a rationale for an opposite 
result18 with very similar data and method has to be provided. We maintain that this 
difference is due to our focus on a single country only with a fully rooted democracy 
rather than on a pool of countries. Therefore, the problem we are facing is the effect 
of the persistence of dissatisfaction – the long run effect of the degree of inequality – 
and how the citizens react as a strategy to cope with inequality rather than their 
reaction to the dissatisfaction as such. Whilst the latter might easily be a sort of 
renounce to any participation, the first requires an action to be reverted. This leads, 
amongst others, to the issue of sustaining an active citizenship and of limiting 
inequality as an engine of deterioration in the quality of democracy.   
Lastly, though this paper focusses on the effects of inequality on (still rough 
indicators of) democracy, some side-results of a more sociological nature are 
worthwhile noticing. All the three variables – Democracy-Satisfaction, Political 
Discussion and Participation into Elections – seem have increased through time and 
seem to be positively linked to age, marital status, education, and – on average – on 
good employment positions, and a female gender detachment from politics emerges. 
Living in Great Britain instead of Northern Ireland seems to provide a more reactive 
attitude towards institutions, and living in an urban location plays a positive role for 
participation and a negative role for democracy satisfaction, which is in line with the 
opportunities and the shortcomings that an urban area offers.  
                                                          
17
 Solt 2008, 48-9. 
18
 Solt 2008. 
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APPENDIX 
Descriptive statistics  
Tables A1-A4 contain the main descriptive statistics of the variables. Table A1 
relates to the three dependent variables, and Tables A2, A3, and A4 to the 
independent variables.  
As for the first dependent one, during the whole period around 47 per cent of 
the sample feels on average “fairly satisfied” with how democracy works in UK, 
only 9 per cent is “very satisfied” with it, 29 per cent is “not very satisfied” and 15 
per cent is “not satisfied at all”.  The second one has been continuously collected 
since 1975 and, still on average, about a half of the sample discusses “occasionally” 
about politics, 35 per cent “never” and 14 per cent “frequently”. Lastly, 92 per cent 
on average of the sample would participate in elections if there were a general 
election very soon.  
Table A1 - Descriptive statistics on the dependent variables 
  Obs Percentage 
 
Democracy-Satisfaction   
Very satisfied 60,699 8.5% 
Fairly satisfied 60,699 47.6% 
Not very satisfied 60,699 29.2% 
Not satisfied at all 60,699 14.7% 
Political Discussion   
Frequently 93,631 14.1% 
Occasionally 93,631 51.0% 
Never 93,631 34.9% 
Participation into Elections   
Would participate 52,461 92.4% 
Would not participate 
 
52,461 
 
7.6% 
 
Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer 
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Descriptive statistics on the inequality indices are presented in Table A2 (their 
temporal profile will be presented in Figures A1a-c), while those for controls are 
given in Tables A3 and A4. In particular, Table A3 presents descriptive statistics on 
the sample of individuals for which we estimate the ordered probit model on 
Political Discussion with reference to continuous and ordinal variables. This sample 
is larger than both Democracy-Satisfaction and Participation into Elections, as this 
variable was collected over the whole study period except for 1974 only. Table A4 
presents descriptive statistics for the dummy variables (in this case, standard 
deviations and minimum and maximum values have no meaning). 
Table A2 -  Descriptive statistics on the inequality indices 
  Obs Mean SD Min Max 
 
Gini coefficient  39 0.306 0.037 0.246 0.358 
Foster-Wolfson index 39 0.256 0.030 0.207 0.292 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  39 3.534 0.670 2.514 4.222 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 39 1.973 0.124 1.764 2.107 
Share top 1%  39 0.058 0.013 0.038 0.093 
Share top 5%  39 0.157 0.019 0.126 0.196 
Share top 10%  39 0.247 0.022 0.211 0.288 
Share bottom 1%  39 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 
Share bottom 5%  39 0.016 0.004 0.011 0.022 
Share bottom 10% 
  
39 
 
0.038 
 
0.008 
 
0.029 
 
0.051 
 
Source: elaborations on FES-FRS 
Table A3 - Descriptive statistics on the independent continuous and ordinal control 
variables 
  
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
 
Age 93,631 45.6 18.2 15 99 
Year 93,631 1992 9.7 1975 2009 
Household Income decile 
 
51,689 
 
5.5 
 
2.9 
 
1 
 
10 
 
Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer 
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Table A4 -  Descriptive statistics on the dummy control variables 
  
   Obs 
 
          Percentage 
 
 
Male (vs. female) 93,631 47.0% 
Married (vs. other marital status) 93,631 65.3% 
Urban (vs. rural) 93,631 62.5% 
GB (vs. NI) 93,631 77.7% 
Education:   
University 93,631 12.0% 
Secondary 93,631 46.3% 
Lower than secondary 93,631 41.7% 
Occupational status:   
Self-employed/entrepreneur 93,631 6.6% 
Manager 93,631 8.1% 
White collar 93,631 15.9% 
Manual worker 93,631 22.8% 
Retired  93,631 20.6% 
Unemployed 93,631 6.9% 
Non-actives 
 
93,631 
 
19.2% 
 
Source: elaborations on Eurobarometer 
Inequality indices 
Inequality indices were computed using the Family Expenditure Survey data 
covering the 1971-2000 period, and the Family Resources Survey data covering the 
1994-2009 period19. FES surveys covering years before 1971 have not been used 
because of some inconsistency of the variable collected, true for the 1993 FRS 
survey too.  
As it can be seen from the Figures A1a, A1b and A1c, when the two surveys 
overlap (1994-2000) there is a discrepancy between the inequality indices calculated 
using FES and those calculated using FRS. This is inevitable when using different 
survey data and might be due to systematic differences in the sampling procedures or 
                                                          
19
 Both surveys were downloaded by the UK data archive (http://data-archive.ac.uk/).  
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in the questionnaires. In order to overcome this problem, we analysed the 
relationship between the two series. We regressed FRS indicators on FES ones for 
the overlapping period, then the regression coefficients were used to build data for 
the 1971-1993 period for the FRS (see the long dashed line). It must be noticed that it 
is possible to see from the graphs the presence of some outliers in both surveys’ 
indices, especially for the share of top incomes computed using FRS. This comes 
from the fact that, differently from FES, in some series of the FRS survey some 
especially high income levels are recorded.  
Figure A1a - Inequality indices: Gini index and Foster-Wolfson index 
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Source: elaborations on FES and FRS 
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Figure A1b - Inequality indices: Interdecile-Ratios 
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Figure A1c - Inequality indices: Shares of Top and Bottom Incomes 
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Factor analysis on inequality indices 
Very high correlation coefficients - obviously negative for the bottom-shares - 
among all inequality indicators emerge both from the previous graphs and from the 
correlation matrix (Table A5). Before running the FA, the internal consistency of our 
set of inequality indicators has been tested by a standardized Cronbach alpha=0.99. 
The standardized version of Cronbach alpha has been preferred to the raw measure, 
as our indicators dimensionally differ: Gini ranges from 0 to 1, shares of top and 
bottom incomes also range between 0 and 1, interdecile ratios can take any positive 
number greater than 1 being ratios between a greater and a smaller quantity, FW can 
assume any value greater than 0.  
Table A5 - Correlation matrix of the inequality indicators 
 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
Gini  (1) 1          
FW  (2) 0.973 1         
P90/P10 (3) 0.983 0.975 1        
P90/P50 (4) 0.983 0.984 0.983 1       
Top 1% (5) 0.882 0.778 0.798 0.816 1      
Top 5% (6) 0.970 0.901 0.917 0.928 0.965 1     
Top 10% (7) 0.988 0.934 0.949 0.958 0.939 0.995 1    
Bottom1% (8) -0.897 -0.843 -0.907 -0.866 -0.752 -0.846 -0.873 1   
Bottom 5% (9) -0.955 -0.909 -0.967 -0.934 -0.798 -0.902 -0.930 0.975 1  
Bottom 10% 
 
(10) -0.975 
 
-0.941 
 
-0.986 
 
-0.958 
 
-0.809 
 
-0.918 
 
-0.947 
 
0.954 
 
0.995 
 
1 
 
Source: elaboration on FES-FRS data 
The structure of the data has then been analysed using Explorative Factor 
Analysis (EFA). Using both the Kaiser criterion (i.e. eigenvalues>1) and the scree 
plot of eigenvalues (Figure A2), the suggested number of factors to be extracted is 1 
revealing that the ten indicators are expression of a unique latent construct. This 
leads us to run a Confirmative Factor Analysis (CFA) on a single latent factor. In 
Table A6 the factor loadings - i.e. the coefficients measuring the linear relationship 
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between the inequality indicators and the latent factor of the CFA - are reported. As 
expected from the variance-covariance matrix, they are very close to one (or minus 
one). 
Figure A2 -  Scree plot of eigenvalues after EFA 
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Source: elaboration on FES-FRS data 
Table A6 - Factor loadings of the CFA 
  Factor loadings (λ)  
 
Gini coefficient  0.997 
Foster-Wolfson index 0.959 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  0.983 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 0.977 
Share top 1%  0.883 
Share top 5%  0.969 
Share top 10%  0.987 
Share bottom 1%  -0.923 
Share bottom 5%  -0.972 
Share bottom 10%  
 
-0.985 
 
Source: elaboration on FES-FRS data 
Predicted probabilities and marginal effects in probit and ordered probit models 
In the first case - Democracy-Satisfaction - the predicted probabilities are: “not 
at all satisfied” with democracy, 0.153 (that means 15.3 per cent of the sample is 
“not at all satisfied”); “not very satisfied”, 0.305 (30.5 per cent); “fairly satisfied”, 
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0.469 (46.9 per cent); “very satisfied”, 0.073 (7.3 per cent). The marginal effects are 
shown in Table A7. 
Table A7 - Ordered probit model on Democracy-Satisfaction: marginal effects 
  
 
Not at all  
satisfied  
Not very 
satisfied  
Fairly 
satisfied  
Very  
satisfied 
Inequality (min → max)   0.053  0.040 -0.058 -0.036 
Age (min → max)  -0.048 -0.035  0.053  0.031 
Male  (0 → 1)  -0.008 -0.006  0.009  0.005 
Married  (0 → 1) -0.012 -0.008  0.014  0.007 
Education: University (0 → 1)  -0.032 -0.026  0.035  0.023 
Education: secondary (0 → 1)  -0.030 -0.023  0.032  0.021 
Self-employed/entrepr. (0 → 1) -0.002 -0.001  0.002  0.001 
Manager (0 → 1) -0.020 -0.015  0.022  0.013 
White collar (0 → 1) -0.015 -0.011  0.016  0.009 
Manual worker (0 → 1)  0.010  0.007 -0.011 -0.006 
Retired (0 → 1) -0.003 -0.002 0.004  0.002 
Unemployed (0 → 1)  0.066  0.033 -0.070 -0.029 
Urban (0 → 1)   0.015  0.011 -0.017 -0.010 
Year (start →  end) -0.065 -0.046  0.070  0.041 
Great Britain (0 → 1) 
 
-0.139 
 
-0.048 
 
 0.140 
 
 0.047 
 
Source: elaboration on Eurobarometer data 
An increase in Inequality from its observed min to the max increases the probability 
of being “not at all satisfied” with democracy by 0.053 (i.e., 5.3 percentage points) 
and of being “not very satisfied” by 0.040 (4 percentage points); in parallel, the 
probability of being “fairly satisfied” decreases by 0.058 (5.8 percentage points) and 
of being “very satisfied” by 0.036 (3.6 percentage points).  
As far as the effect of age is concerned, ageing people are more likely to 
display higher levels of Democracy-Satisfaction: an increase in age from its min to 
its max determines a 4.8 percentage points fall in the probability of being “not at all 
satisfied”, a 3.5 points decrease in the probability of being “not very satisfied”, a 5.3 
increase in the probability of being “fairly satisfied” and a 3.1 increase in the 
probability of being “very satisfied”.   
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Males are more likely than females to display higher levels of Democracy-
Satisfaction: the likelihood of being “not at all satisfied” and “not very satisfied” is 
0.8 and 0.6 percentage points  respectively lower than for females; on the contrary, 
the probability of being “fairly satisfied” and “very satisfied”  are respectively  0.9 
and 0.5 points  higher. The marital status figures do not depart substantially from 
these values: -1.2, -0.8, +1.4, +0.7. 
Better educated individuals are more likely than less educated to display higher 
levels of Democracy-Satisfaction: the likelihood of being “not at all satisfied” 
decreases by 3.2 percentage points if the individual has a university degree and by 
3.0 percentage points if the individual has a secondary degree (both compared with a 
lower degree). Similarly, the likelihood of being “not very satisfied” declines by 2.6 
percentage points if the individual has a university degree and by 2.3 percentage 
points if the individual has a secondary degree. On the other hand, the probability of 
being “fairly satisfied” for people with university degree is 3.2 percentage points 
higher than for people with lower education. In the case of secondary degree, it is 3.2 
percentage points higher; and the probability of being “very satisfied” is 2.3 
percentage points higher for people with university degree and 2.1 percentage point 
higher for people with secondary degree.  
Individuals in managerial and clerk position are more likely to be more 
satisfied with democracy (compared with the non-actives): they show respectively a 
2 and 1.5 percentage points lower probability of being “not at all satisfied”; a 1.5 and 
1.1 points lower probability of being “not very satisfied”, while showing a 2.2 and 
1.6 percentage points higher probability of being “fairly satisfied” and 1.3 and 0.9 
percentage points higher probability of being “very satisfied”. On the contrary, 
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manual workers and unemployed are significantly less satisfied with democracy. 
They have higher probabilities of being “not at all satisfied” and “not very satisfied”: 
respectively +1 and +0.7 percentage points in the case of manual workers and +6.6 
and 3.6 percentage points in the case of unemployed.  In parallel, they are less likely 
to be “fairly satisfied and very satisfied”: -1.1 and -0.6 percentage points if manual 
workers and -7 and -2.9 percentage points if unemployed. 
The probability of being “not at all” and “not very satisfied” if living in an 
urban area is 1.5 and 1.1 percentage points higher than in a rural area. The dummy 
variable distinguishing individuals living in Great Britain from those living in 
Northern Ireland has a greater (quasi-dramatic) effect: the former has a 13.9 
percentage points lower probability of being “not at all satisfied” with respect to the 
latter, a 4.8 percentage points lower probability of being “not very satisfied”, a 14.0 
percentage points higher probability of being “fairly satisfied” and a 4.7 percentage 
points higher probability of being “very satisfied”.  
As far as the time trend is concerned, the probabilities of being “not at all 
satisfied” and “not very satisfied” decrease by 6.5 and 4.6 percentage points, whilst 
the probabilities of being “fairly satisfied”  and “very satisfied” increase by 7.0 and 
4.1 percentage points.  
Table A8 relates to the Political Discussion model. Again, for a better 
understanding of these figures, we first show the predicted probability once all the 
explanatory variables assume their median value. The probability of “never” 
discussing about politics is 0.451 (45.1 per cent), of “occasionally” discussing about 
politics is 0.468 (46.8 per cent) and of doing it frequently is 0.081 (8.1 per cent). 
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Table A8 - Ordered probit model on Political Discussion: marginal effects 
  Never Occasionally Frequently 
Inequality (min → max)  -0.034 0.022  0.012 
Age (min → max)  -0.245 0.134  0.111 
Male  (0 → 1)  -0.096 0.052  0.044 
Married  (0 → 1) -0.048 0.032  0.017 
Education: University (0 → 1)  -0.215 0.085  0.130 
Education: secondary (0 → 1)  -0.067 0.038  0.029 
Self-employed/entrepr. (0 → 1) -0.121 0.062  0.059 
Manager (0 → 1) -0.138 0.069  0.069 
White collar (0 → 1) -0.090 0.049  0.041 
Manual worker (0 → 1) -0.010 0.006  0.004 
Retired (0 → 1) -0.020 0.012  0.008 
Unemployed (0 → 1)  0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Urban (0 → 1)  -0.028 0.018  0.010 
Year (start →  end)  0.131 -0.082 -0.049 
Great Britain (0 → 1) 
 
-0.048 
 
 0.032 
 
 0.017 
 
Source:  elaboration on Eurobarometer data 
As stated by Table A8, an increase in Inequality from its min to its max 
decreases the probability of “never” talking about politics by 0.034 (3.4 percentage 
points), increases of 0.022 (2.2 percentage points) the probability of “occasionally” 
talking about politics and of 0.012 (1.2 percentage points) the probability of frequent 
Political Discussions. 
The older people are, the more frequently they have Political Discussions: 
changing age-variable value from its min to its max (while holding all other variables 
fixed at their median) makes the probability of “never” talking about politics to fall 
by 0.245 (24.5 percentage points) and increases the probability of talking about 
politics “occasionally” and “frequently” by respectively 13.4 and 11.1 percentage 
points. 
Males, married and better educated individuals, together with those living in an 
urban area are likely to discuss more frequently about politics. In particular, males’ 
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likelihood of discussing “never” is 9.6 percentage points lower than for females, 
while their likelihood of discussing “occasionally” and “frequently” is respectively 
5.2 and 4.4 percentage points higher. Concerning married individuals, the change in 
the predicted probabilities of the three outcomes is respectively of -4.8, +3.2 and 
+1.7 percentage points.  
Similarly to what seen for Democracy-Satisfaction, individuals with a 
university degree are more likely to talk about politics than those with secondary 
degree who, in turn, are more likely to talk about politics than the reference group of 
individuals with a lower education level.  People with a university degree are less 
likely than the reference group to “never” discuss about politics (-21.5 percentage 
points), while are more likely to discuss “occasionally” (+8.5) and “frequently” 
(+13). The analogous percentage point changes in the case of individuals with 
secondary school degree are -6.7, +3.8 and 2.9. 
As far as the employment condition is considered, self-employed/entrepreneur 
and managers are much less likely to discuss “never”  about politics (respectively -
12.1 and -13.8 percentage points) and more likely to discuss “occasionally” (+6.2 
and +6.9 percentage points) and “frequently” (+5.9 and +6.9 percentage points). Also 
white collars and retired from work discuss about politics more than the non-actives, 
the magnitude of this effect not being so relevant as in the previous case: respectively 
-9 and -2 percentage points probability of “never” discussing about politics; +4.9 and 
+1.2 percentage points probability of  discussing “occasionally” and +4.1 and +0.8 
percentage points probability of  discussing “frequently”.  
Living in an urban area rather than in a rural area decreases the probability of 
“never” talking about politics by 2.8 percentage points, while increasing by 1.8 and 1 
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percentage points the probability of “occasionally” and “frequently” talking about 
politics. Living in Great Britain positively affects the frequency of Political 
Discussion, the effect being not as high as in the case of Democracy-Satisfaction: a 
4.8 percentage points decrease of “never” talking about politics with respect to 
people from Northern Ireland, and a 3.2 percentage points increase of “occasionally” 
talking about politics and a 1.7 percentage points increase of “frequently” talking 
about politics. Political Discussion declines over time: “never” talking about politics 
is 13.1 percentage points more likely at the end of the considered period than at the 
beginning. In the same time span, the probability of occasional and frequent Political 
Discussion decreases respectively by 8.2 and 4.9 percentage points.  
Table A9 shows the marginal effects of the probit model on Participation into 
Elections. Let us recall that the predicted probability of participating in elections 
(again, setting all explanatory variables at their median value) is equal to 0.940 (94.0 
per cent).  
A rise in Inequality (from its minimum to its maximum value) increases the 
probability of participating in elections by 0.037 (3.7 percentage points). Also getting 
older increases the probability of participating in elections by 7.3 percentage points.  
Married individuals’ likelihood to vote is 1.9 percentage points higher than 
individuals with a different civil status. Individuals with university degree show a 2.5 
percentage points higher probability to vote with respect to individuals with no 
university degree; the change is of +1.0 percentage points in the case of secondary 
education.  
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Table A9 - Probit model Participation into Elections – marginal effects 
  Participation 
into Elections 
Inequality (min → max)   0.037 
Age (min → max)   0.073 
Male  (0 → 1)   0.003 
Married  (0 → 1)  0.019 
Education: University (0 → 1)   0.025 
Education: secondary (0 → 1)   0.010 
Self-employed/entrepr. (0 → 1) -0.003 
Manager (0 → 1)  0.017 
White collar (0 → 1)  0.011 
Manual worker (0 → 1) -0.001 
Retired (0 → 1)  0.006 
Unemployed (0 → 1) -0.014 
Urban (0 → 1)  -0.002 
Year (start →  end) -0.099 
Great Britain (0 → 1) 
 
 0.078 
 
Source: elaboration on Eurobarometer data 
Regarding the employment condition, individuals in managerial and white 
collar occupations are more likely to participate in elections (+1.7 and 1.1 percentage 
points). On the contrary, being unemployed decreases this probability by 1.4 
percentage points. The probability of participating in election is 7.8 percentage points 
higher in Great Britain than in Northern Ireland. Similarly to Political Discussion, 
Participation into Elections decreases through time: going from the beginning to the 
end of the period, voting probability goes down by 9.9 percentage points.  
As far as the additional ten indicators of inequality are concerned, the results 
are consistent (Tables A10, A11 and A12). Moreover, the indicators which have the 
greater effects are unambiguously the shares of bottom income, in particular the 1%, 
which seems quite understandable. 
45 
 
Table A10 - Marginal effects for all inequality variables in the Democracy-
Satisfaction model   
  Not at all  
satisfied  
Not very 
satisfied  
Fairly 
satisfied  
Very  
satisfied 
Inequality  0.053  0.040 -0.058 -0.036 
Gini coefficient   0.048  0.037 -0.052 -0.033 
Foster-Wolfson index  0.053  0.041 -0.057 -0.037 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10   0.055  0.043 -0.059 -0.038 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50  0.045  0.035 -0.048 -0.031 
Share top 1% -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000 
Share top 5%   0.028  0.021 -0.031 -0.018 
Share top 10%   0.036  0.027 -0.039 -0.024 
Share bottom 1%  -0.136 -0.102   0.144  0.094 
Share bottom 5%  -0.087 -0.068   0.094  0.062 
Share bottom 10%  
 
-0.069 
 
-0.054 
 
  0.075 
 
 0.049 
 
Note: marginal effects are calculated changing all variables from their minimum to their 
maximum;  Source: elaboration on Eurobarometer data 
Table A11 - Marginal effects for all inequality variables in the Political Discussion 
model 
  Never Occasionally Frequently 
Inequality -0.034 0.022 0.012 
Gini coefficient  -0.031 0.019 0.011 
Foster-Wolfson index -0.033 0.021 0.012 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  -0.032 0.020 0.012 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 -0.038 0.024 0.014 
Share top 1%  -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Share top 5%  -0.018 0.012 0.007 
Share top 10%  -0.025 0.016 0.009 
Share bottom 1%  0.049 -0.031 -0.018 
Share bottom 5%  0.057 -0.037 -0.021 
Share bottom 10%  
 
0.042 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.015 
 
Note: marginal effects are calculated changing all variables from their minimum to their 
maximum; Source: elaboration on Eurobarometer data 
Table A12 - Marginal effects for all inequality variables in the Participation into 
Elections model 
  Participation 
into Elections 
Inequality 0.037 
Gini coefficient  0.036 
Foster-Wolfson index 0.024 
Interdecile ratio P90/P10  0.024 
Interdecile ratio P90/P50 0.029 
Share top 1%  0.019 
Share top 5%  0.030 
Share top 10%  0.033 
Share bottom 1% -0.022 
Share bottom 5%  -0.049 
Share bottom 10%  
 
-0.037 
 
Note: marginal effects are calculated changing all variables from their minimum to their 
maximum; Source: elaboration on Eurobarometer data 
46 
 
References 
Anderson, Christofer J. and Pablo Beramendi. 2008. Income, Inequality and 
Electoral Participation. Pp. 278-312 in Democracy, Inequality and Representation – 
A Comparative Perspective, edited by Pablo Beramendi, Christofer J. Anderson. 
New York: Russell Sage. 
Atkinson, Anthony B., and Andrea Brandolini. 2006. The Panel-of-Countries 
Approach to Explaining Income Inequality: an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda. 
Pp. 400-48 in Mobility and Inequality: Frontiers of Research in Sociology and 
Economics (Studies in Social Inequality), edited by Stephen L. Morgan, David B. 
Gruski and Gary S. Fields. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Bartels, Larry M. 2008. Unequal Democracy; the Political Economy of the New 
Gilded Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bermeo, Nancy. 2009. Does Electoral Democracy Boost Economic Equality? 
Journal of Democracy 20(4): 21-35. 
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bollen, Kenneth A., and Robert W. Jackman. 1985. Political Democracy and the 
Size Distribution of Income. American Sociological Review 50(4):438-57. 
Bollen, Kenneth A., and Richard Lennox. 1991. Conventional Wisdom on 
Measurement: A Structural Equation Perspective. Psychological Bulletin 100:305-
14. 
Dahl, Robert Alan. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Dahl, Robert Alan. 2000. On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino. 2004. The Quality of Democracy: An 
Overview. Journal of Democracy 15(4):20-31. 
Edwards, Jeffrey R., and Richard P. Bagozzi. 2000. On the Nature and Direction 
of Relationships between Constructs and Measures. Psychological Methods 5:155-
74. 
47 
 
Foster, James E., and Michael C. Wolfson. 2010 [1992]. Polarization and the 
Decline of the Middle Class: Canada and the U.S. Journal of Economic Inequality 
8(2):133-273. 
Glyn, Andrew. 2006. Capitalism Unleashed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Karl, Terry Lynn. 2000. Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability. Journal of 
Democracy 11(1):149-56. 
Krueger, Alan B. 2012. The Rise and Consequences of Inequality. Speech at the 
Center for the American Progress, Washington DC. January. 
Lambert, Peter J. 2010. James Foster and Michael Wolfson’s 1992 “Paper 
Polarization and the Decline of the Middle Class”. Journal of Economic Inequality 
8:241–45.  
Li, Hongyi, Lyn Squire, and Heng-fu Zou. 1998. Explaining International and 
Intertemporal Variations in Income and Inequality. The Economic Journal 108:26-
43. 
Mueller, Edward N. 1988. Democracy, Economic Development and Income 
Inequality. American Sociological Review 53(1):50-68. 
OECD. 2008. Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD 
Countries.  Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Solt, Frederick. 2004. Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement. 
LIS Working Paper 385. 
Solt, Frederick. 2008. Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement. 
American Journal of Political Science 52(2):48-60. 
Stepan, Alfred, and Juan J. Linz. 2011. Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and 
the Quality of Democracy in the United States: Review Essay. American Political 
Science Review 9(4):841-56.  
Sunde, Uwe, Matteo Cervellati, and Piergiuseppe Fortunato. 2007. Are All 
Democracies Equally Good? The Role of Interactions Between Political 
Environment and Inequality for Rule of Law. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2984. 
48 
 
Thorbecke, Erik, and Charumilind Chutatong. 2002. Economic Inequality and Its 
Socioeconomic Impact.  World Development 30(9):1477-95. 
Wilkinson, Richard and Kate Pickett. 2010. The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better 
for Everyone. London: Penguin. 
Winters, Jeffrey A. 2011. Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
Data-source references 
Eurobarometer Data  
European Commission. 2011.  Eurobarometer 71.1 (Jan-Feb 2009). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4971 Data file 
Version 3.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10993. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 70.1 (Oct-Nov 2008). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4819 Data file 
Version 3.0.2, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10989. 
European Commission. 2011. Eurobarometer 69.2 (Mar-May 2008). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4744 Data file 
Version 4.0.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10992. 
European Commission. 2012.  Eurobarometer 68.1 (Sep-Nov 2007). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4565 Data file 
Version 4.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10988. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 67.2 (Apr-May 2007). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4530 Data file 
Version 2.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10984. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 66.1 (Sep-Oct 2006). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4526 Data file 
Version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10980. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 65.2 (Mar-May 2006). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4506 Data file 
Version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10974. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 65.1 (Feb-Mar 2006). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4505 Data file 
Version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/:10.4232/1.10973. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 64.3 (Nov-Dec 2005). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4415 Data file 
Version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10971. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 64.2 (Oct-Nov 2005). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4414 Data file 
Version 1.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10970.  
49 
 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 63.4 (May-Jun 2005). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4411 Data file 
Version 1.1.0,  http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.109688.  
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 63.1 (Jan-Feb 2005). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4233 Data file 
Version 1.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/:10.4232/1.10965. 
European Commission.2012. Eurobarometer 62.0 (Oct-Nov 2004). TNS OPINION & 
SOCIAL, Brussels [Producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4229 Data file 
Version 1.1.0, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10962.  
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 61 (Feb-Mar 2004). European Opinion 
Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA4056 Data file 
Version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10961.  
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 60.1 (Oct-Nov 2003). European Opinion 
Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3938 Data file 
Version 1.0.1,  http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10958. 
European Commission. 2012. Eurobarometer 59.1 (Mar-Apr 2003). European Opinion 
Research Group (EORG), Brussels. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA3904 Data file 
Version 1.0.1, http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10955.  
Schmitt, Hermann, and Evi Scholz. The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-
2002. Prepared by Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung. ICPSR04357-v1. 
Mannheim, Germany: Mannheimer Zentrum fur Europaische Sozialforschung and 
Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen [producers], 2005. Cologne, Germany: 
Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], December 2005,  
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04357.v1.  
FES Data  
Office for National Statistics, Family Expenditure Survey, 2000-2001 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], May 2002. SN: 4490, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4490-1. 
Office for National Statistics, Family Expenditure Survey, 1999-2000 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 2001. SN: 4315, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4315-1. 
Office for National Statistics, Family Expenditure Survey, 1998-1999 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 2000. SN: 4071, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4071-1. 
Office for National Statistics, Family Expenditure Survey, 1997-1998 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], March 1999. SN: 3963, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3963-1. 
Office for National Statistics, Family Expenditure Survey, 1996-1997 [computer file]. 
2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2000. SN: 3783, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3783-1. 
50 
 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1995-1996 [computer file]. 2nd 
Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], December 1997. SN: 3635, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3635-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1994-1995 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 1996. SN: 3478, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3478-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1993-1994 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 1995. SN: 3280, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3280-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1993 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], September 1994. SN: 3242, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3242-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1992 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3064, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3064-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1991 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 1992. SN: 2944, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2944-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1990 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 1992. SN: 2918, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2918-1. 
Central Statistical Office, Family Expenditure Survey, 1989 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 1992. SN: 2916, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2916-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1988 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], February 1990. SN: 2683, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2683-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1987 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], September 1989. SN: 2647, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2647-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1986 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], January 1989. SN: 2556, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2556-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1985 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 1987. SN: 2214, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2214-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1984 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], June 1986. SN: 2136, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2136-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1983 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1985. SN: 2016, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-2016-1. 
51 
 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1982 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 1984. SN: 1921, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-1921-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1981 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3058, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3058-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1980 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3057, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3057-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1979 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3056, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3056-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1978 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3055, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3055-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1977 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3054, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3054-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1976 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3053, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3053-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1975 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3052, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3052-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1974 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3051, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3051-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1973 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3050, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3050-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1972 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3049, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3049-1. 
Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey, 1971 [computer file]. 
Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], August 1993. SN: 3048, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3048-1. 
FRS Data 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2009-
2010 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
October 2012. SN: 6886, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6886-2. 
52 
 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2008-
2009 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
October 2012. SN: 6523, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6523-2.  
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2007-
2008 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2009. SN: 
6252, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6252-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2006-
2007 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
July 2009. SN: 6079, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6079-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2005-
2006 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], November 
2007. SN: 5742, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5742-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2004-
2005 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
December 2007. SN: 5291, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5291-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2003-
2004 [computer file]. 4th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
December 2007. SN: 5139, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5139-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions, National Centre for Social Research and Office for 
National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, Family Resources Survey, 2002-
2003 [computer file]. 4th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 
December 2007. SN: 4803, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4803-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions, Office for National Statistics. Social Survey 
Division and National Centre for Social Research, Family Resources Survey, 2001-2002 
[computer file]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 4633, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4633-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 2000-2001 
[computer file]. 3rd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 4498, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4498-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 1999-2000 
[computer file]. 4th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 4389, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4389-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 1998-1999 
[computer file]. 4th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 4149, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4149-1. 
53 
 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 1997-1998 
[computer file]. 6th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 4068, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4068-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 1996-1997 
[computer file]. 5th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 3957, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3957-1 . 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 1995-1996 
[computer file]. 5th Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], April 
2005. SN: 3761, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3761-1. 
Department for Work and Pensions et al. , Family Resources Survey, 1994-1995 
[computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], May 
2005. SN: 3592, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-3592-1 
 
